There has been much hype and speculation in the media and in academe on the vitality and future of the "internet economy". This paper assesses the strengths and weaknesses of online grocery retailers, from national chain stores pursuing a "bricks and clicks" strategy to "pure-play" startups, using case studies from Britain, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. It argues that delivering groceries via the internet to customer doorsteps requires ways of solving space and time that is markedly different from previous trends in food retail logistics. The paper holds that solving problems of space management creates problems in the management of time and vice versa. In particular, "e-tailers" struggle with fulfilment costs and logistics, and have attempted to manage customers' time and locations to reduce these costs. Store-based operations may be best suited for short-term profitability (or loss minimisation), while warehouse-based fulfilment may hold future promise of greater efficiency and flexibility. The paper suggests that online organic home delivery may be the most successful type of online food retailer, for its size, given greater customer commitment and problems with storebased supply of organic food.
online customers than the upstarts. The view that "cyber shopping" was 'a panacea with unlimited potential' (Jones and Biasiotto, 1999: 70) had lost its lustre.
In this paper I argue that to understand the potential and the difficulties posed by online grocery, one of the poster-children of the "new economy" of electronic commerce, requires unpacking issues of fulfilment logistics: of picking, packing and delivery. I contend that virtual retailing is a complicated business, and one that involves quite different problems from those of "bricks and mortar" stores. I argue that the core of the difficulties for online grocers are related to the management of space and time, and that online grocers are re-solving these issues in incompatible ways, both to each othersolving problems of time creates problems in space and vice versa -and in ways quite different to traditional retailers. There is a paucity of antecedent literature due to the newness of the subject (although logistics and the management of space and time are not new subjects to geography), and broad statistics and general indicators are distinctly noticeable by their absence or poor quality. The paper therefore makes heavy use of case study material from Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and New Zealand to analyse these issues.
Following on from some sketchy predictions from the 1980s and 90s of the impact of computer mediation on retailing (Guy, 1985; Bennison, 1985) and communication (Batty, 1994 (Batty, , 1997 , academic papers on retailer use of the internet are emerging (Reynolds, 1997 (Reynolds, , 2000 Jones and Biasiotto, 1999; Dawson, 2000; Hart, Doherty and Ellis-Chadwick, 2000; Aoyama, 2001; Dodge, 2001; Kämäräinen et al, 2001; Verhoef and Langerak, 2001; Currah, 2003; Oinas, 2002; Wrigley, Lowe and Currah, 2002) .
Early efforts were little more than an inventory of how many retailers were online and the extent to which virtuality was incorporated into their web presence (Spiller and Lohse, 1997; Griffith and Krampf, 1998; Pritchard, 1999) . Jones and Biasiotto (1999) see "the literature on Internet retailing" (no sources provided) as providing a bi-polar outlook, from those extolling 'the promise of electronic retailing, suggesting that as much as 55 per cent of all purchases will be non-store-based by 2015 ' (p. 70) to those that 'characterize Internet shopping as a format where the "hype exceeds the potential"' (citing Management Horizons, 1997).
1 Hart et al (2000: 955) view the potential of the internet very much in the former, where 'ultimately the Internet could fundamentally 1
In a rather in-aptly named 1997 piece entitled "Decline of Interent hype" -as shown in this paper, the real hype surrounding online grocery (in the US at least) did not peak until the year 2000.
alter the way that consumers shop and thus revolutionise the retail environment, transforming the local high street into a global cyber high street'. In their view this could occur as retailers added online transactions as an additional channel to an existing store-or mail-based infrastructure, and with proven success could close bricks and mortar operations in favour of the electronic.
Primarily this success would come from the improved means for targeting and communicating interactively with customers, over and above that provided through store loyalty cards and electronic point of sale systems, which had been the key to retail growth during the 1980s and 1990s Lowe and Wrigley, 1996; Guy, 1988) . Dawson (2000: 136-7) , in a review of retail management challenges, comments that 'some retailers and commentators think that the Internet and electronic retailing represent the first paradigm shift in retailing for over fifty years' 2 , although
Dawson also notes that of this 'much is promised but little has been delivered'. Jones and Biasiotto (1999: 71) suggests that 'Internet shopping is beginning to fulfil its promise to … reduce / eliminate the effects of time and space in the act of consumption'
as well as increasing access by customers to specialised goods and services and allowing the tailoring of the shopping environment to specific customer needs.
The more extreme accounts postulate the "death of distance" (Cairncross, 1997) , although this frictionless, geography-doesn't-matter view of the world would naturally apply more to industries primarily manipulating information (digital "bits", in Negroponte's (1995) terminology) rather than goods ("atoms"). Thus music (Leyshon, 2001) , movies or airline tickets are more readily (albeit incompletely) revolutionised by the internet than groceries, due to simplified logistics associated with web-enabled commerce. Some groceries require particular temperatures and come with various government regulations on cool chain quality control, and most have expiry dates and can be squashed. Customers have expectations about how groceries look and feel which simply do not apply to music or airline tickets. Wrigley (2000: 311) , while noting 'the rise of e-commerce as a potentially destabilizing force' (my emphasis) within economic geographies of globalizing retail capital, was not convinced at the time that internet-based retail would amount to much of a threat to 2 Dawson (2000: 142) views the various conceptions of the UK "retail revolution" (Bromley & Thomas, 1993) within the retail literature as reflecting more a longer-term evolution than a paradigmatic shift.
stores, particularly for food and clothing where stores have 'unambiguous operating cost [and] profit margin' competitive advantages (p. 310). Wrigley notes the problem of fulfilment for e-commerce, since non-digitalised goods are inherently "place-bound" and the sunk investment in networks of fulfilment centres and trucks can be substantial (Clark and Wrigley, 1995; Wrigley, 1996 . "Pure-play" internet retailers suffer from numerous disadvantages relative to store networks: a lack of name recognition, familiarity and trust (partly due to store visibility, partly a lack of "history"); and the potentially crippling problem of product returns, as well as the other problems faced by all virtual retailers: the inability to "try" before buying and the lack of impulse buying and instant gratification from immediate purchase (Merrill Lynch, 1999) .
Not all goods (atoms) suffer these problems equally, of course. The more standardised the product and routinised the purchase, the more the product is amenable to "armslength retailing" (Corstjens and Corstjens, 1999; . Thus the properties of particular books, pieces of music and some electrical goods may be sufficiently well known to overcome the need to try before buying in order to reduce customer dissonance. Strong brands may also assuage the problem: if customers are familiar with Starbucks coffee, Heinz ketchup or Levi's 501s then the brand's "mind space" (Corstjens and Corstjens, 1999) may be sufficient to overcome a lack of tangible shelf space. Returning a product may also not be worthwhile -either for customer or retailer -if its cost is low, as is the case for most grocery items. If an online grocery retailer offers standard brands which are readily identifiable, and a "no questions"
refund policy (where the customer keeps the product and is refunded in full if unsatisfied) then these issues may be overcome.
In this paper I do not aim to reinstate the reification of spatial science and homotropic planes, despite its interest in logistics. However, although one of the aims of the "new retail geography" is to 'break free from the conception of retail studies as a minor subset of economic geography situated around retail logistics: an approach that has frequently been characterised by studies of retail catchment or models of store performance' (Hallsworth and Taylor, 1996: 2125) , I argue that logistics cannot be overlooked in a rush toward solely cultural readings of retailing and consumption landscapes. Problems of space and time in distribution were not "solved" by prior spatial-analytic work (see Jones and Simmons, 1990 and papers in Wrigley, 1988 for examples), thus allowing future work to concentrate only on the more sexy issues of representation, the power of discourse, and performativity (Murphy, 2002) . The management of space and time has in fact become intrinsically problematic in an age of Quick Response mechanisms and electronic commerce (Wood, 2002; Murphy, 2002; Birkin et al, 2002) , and there is considerable scope for the training of a social-theoretic lens on logistics and time-space management processes.
Using transcripts from interviews with managers, employees and customers of online and drawing on ethnographic observations from these practices and from other US examples, I aim to give some detail on the tensions inherent in managing space and time in online grocery retailing. The paper does not simply apply a reading of "time-space compression" (Janelle, 1991; Harvey, 1989; Schoenberger, 1997 Schoenberger, , 2000 , but rather considers how solving problems in time may compound problems in space, and vice versa.
I begin by briefly reviewing how food retailers have negotiated the management of space and time over the past few decades. I then show how virtual retailing offers new difficulties and contradictions in the management of space and time, and explore how online retailers have attempted to (re)solve them.
Spacings and Timings: A review of retail logistics
Use of armchair shopping for routine grocery shopping purchases is now beginning to appear a serious commercial proposition. … [However there is a] reluctance of large retail firms to invest substantially in new methods of information handling while these are seen as being in an experimental phase. ... This is partly because retailers have enormous existing assets in their stores, warehouses, equipment and personnel, and wish to continue using them as efficiently as possible.
While the above quote may seem like a timely utterance from a stock market analyst, it actually appeared more than a decade ago, in a text on store choice and location (Guy, 1988, pp. 316-317) . It referred to the potential for using home computers and telephone lines to transmit orders to major grocers and for home delivery of the resulting products, something that had already been market tested by users of British Telecom's 'Prestel' system. While the technology has undergone a revolution in the intervening years, the expectations and scepticism remain consistent. Wariness may prove prudent: some of 3 This paper is informed by and utilises material from in-depth interviews with 50 customers and 24 staff of four online food retailers, many of them interviewed at length multiple times, along with a survey of 330 customers in Vancouver, and access to company data.
the early experimenters in the United States (Peapod, Netgrocer, Homegrocer and Webvan) failed to capitalise on the abundant publicity the media afforded them, and the list of outright failures grows ever longer. Nevertheless, it is worth recalling that retailers were initially similarly hesitant over the perceived benefits of electronic point of sale equipment (the checkout scanner) and electronic funds transfer terminals which today are unremarkable in their ubiquity (Guy, 1988) .
The attitude towards issues of distribution within the economic geography literature has long been classified as one of neglect. While discussing the UK "retail revolution" of the 1970s and 80s, Sparks (1994: 311) remarked that 'distribution or logistics has often been ignored and neglected, despite its vital importance to most businesses '. Wrigley (2000: 292) laments that 'distribution systems and industries are, at best, a very minor, and more frequently, a totally neglected topic', despite the increasingly globalised organisation and reach of the sector. Although studies of the distribution systems of the UK's Tesco (Sparks, 1986 (Sparks, , 1994 Smith and Sparks, 1993) and the grocery industry in general (McKinnon, 1985) were conducted, issues of physical space have typically been overlooked in the shift towards cultural readings of the retail landscape (see for example papers in Wrigley and Lowe, 1996 and Crewe 2000 help overcome this neglect). More esoteric and technical description of logistics problems are covered in the operations research and marketing literature (see for example Beamon, 1998; Ganeshan, 1999; and papers in Hadjiconstantinou, 1999) , while the business literature covers more pragmatic issues (see Abernathy, Dunlop, Hammond and Weil, 2000; Kämäräinen, Småros, Holmstrom and Jaakola, 2001 and Punakivi and Saranen, 2001 ).
Large shifts were occurring within the organisation of infrastructure within the food retail sector nonetheless. Existing widely distributed supply centres were consolidated into fewer, larger regional distribution centres (McKinnon, 1985) . Each of these was linked to a network of increasingly large and out-of-town supermarkets using sophisticated information technology that delivered store inventories just-in-time using "quick response" supplier fulfilment (Sparks, 1994; Hadjiconstantinou, 1999 ). Sparks (1986 ) documents a substantial increase in average store size in the UK through the 1970s and early 1980s, particularly for Tesco, as it closed smaller city-centre stores and opened substantially larger out-of-town superstores located near transportation interstices. Along with this came an increase in the range of products offered and a reduction in the turnover time of products and in labour costs per square foot, resulting in improved margins. Sparks (1986) suggests that the inventory and storage costs of supermarkets were substantial, and moves towards centralised warehousing could lead to considerable cost savings and improved control over distribution. This could come through quantity discounts for bulk purchases, conversion of back-of-store storage space to selling space, improvement in stock quality and control over stock levels, and better stock flow information. UK food retailer Sainsbury's (2001) now has eight regional distribution centres (DCs) ranging from 220,000 square feet to 694,000 square feet, with four of these over 500,000 square feet. The improved logistics systems enhanced the capabilities of British food retailers, who 'progressed from simply being the innocent recipients of manufacturers' transport and storage whims, to controlling and organizing the supply chain, almost in its entirety' (Sparks, 1994: 331) . These trends have significant implications for the usefulness of these stores and DCs for internet-based HomeShopping, as I show below. The long term trend seemed clear:
toward centralisation of stock control, with up to 90 per cent of stock moving through regional distribution centres (Wrigley, 1998a (Wrigley, , 1998b , and a hastening of the circulation of retail capital (Ducatel & Blomley, 1990; Lowe & Wrigley, 1996; Currah, 2002b) .
According to Christopher et al (1983: 19) , logistics systems aim to 'provide a level of timely and spatial physical availability for customers, appropriate to the needs of the market place and the resources of the company', with the further aim of providing a balance 'between the lowest possible distribution costs and the highest possible customer satisfaction' (Sparks, 1994: 313) . Given the inherent dynamics and "creative destruction" within the retail sector it is impossible to determine how well the large outof-town superstore attains the "highest possible customer satisfaction". When faced with a more convenient logistics strategy such as home delivery, customers might reveal a previously hidden latent demand, and thus inflict a potentially destabilising "disruptive innovation" (Christensen, 1997) on food retailing. The key question, of course, is whether the changes within the supply chain and organisation of logistics outlined above help or hinder the development of online grocery, either for the established retailers or for upstart "pure players". Before exploring this question in depth, it is helpful to introduce and contextualise some of the players in online food retailing. (Coopey, O'Connel & Porter, 1999; Davies, 1976) . Home delivery continued in microscale by local stores with "bicycle boys" for customers ordering via the telephone (Cope, 1996) . Computer-mediated ordering of groceries, although necessarily more recent, also predates the internet. A 1985 special issue of Environment and Planning B on computer-mediated communication (Bennison, 1985; Davies, 1985; Guy, 1985; Howard, 1985) outlined trials of "armchair shopping" in the UK using British
Telecom's Prestel service, a combination of dumb terminals, modems and dedicated telephone lines for the delivery of data from 'information providers', including food retailer Tesco. The services, although foreshadowing to a surprising extent both the objectives and terminology of the world wide web, were never revolutionary in impact, attracting far fewer than the expected number of domestic customers (Bennison, 1985) .
After the conclusion of the trials, despite the burgeoning private and in-home ownership of computers, attention switched away from computer-mediated retailing to equally short-lived experiments in interactive television. Tesco was sufficiently unimpressed at the time of these trials to comment that it did 'not expect that there will be a major shift over to home shopping on the Internet' (Reynolds, 1997: 35) .
In North America, however, the increasing penetration into home spaces of computers with modems led to a rapid increase in the number of companies offering home delivery of groceries, first via more expensive (for both retailer and consumer) direct dial-up connections, and by the mid-1990s via the world wide web. Table 1 summarises some of the key experiments in North America in online grocery provision (in the "business to consumer" (B2C) market, as it came to be known -see Reynolds (2000) for an overview), which received much of the attention of the media during the late 1990s.
These experiments can be separated into two broad types (though see Reynolds (2000) for a more nuanced classification): the "store pick", where an existing (self-owned or other) store infrastructure is used to pick orders received from customers via telecommunications or internet networks; and the "warehouse pick", where an existing 4
The Sears Roebuck catalogue had over 10,000 items available, including houses and gravestones (Wrigley and Lowe, 2002: 235) regional distribution centre or purpose-built distribution centre (DC) is used. Most
North American experiments until 2001 followed the warehouse-pick model whereas retailers in other nations focussed more on the store.
The experiments in North America were chasing an tantalising dream: a fortune to be obtained by becoming the "category killer" of online grocery, with forecast revenues in the billions. Datamonitor, a research agency, predicted rapid growth in the online grocery market to reach US$27b by 2005, equivalent to 4.8% of the "traditional" US grocery market (Datamonitor, 2001 ); Palmer (2000) expected sales of $34 billion by
2002. Even more reticent forecasters (Caicco, 2001) were expecting 100-fold growth over at most a six-year period (Table 2) , although these forecasts were downgraded as the dot-com market slumped. Despite these rapid growth rates, however, Caicco (2001) did not expect online grocery to amount to more than one percent of the total grocery market in either Canada or the United States. The profitability and sustainability of this select niche remained elusive with the spectacular failures of WebHouse Club and Webvan. Webvan failed due to infrastructure costs of more than $30 million per fulfilment warehouse (see Murphy, 2003 for an overview), and accumulated losses of US$815m on sales of $271m. 5 The Priceline subsidiary WebHouse Club had a bizarre business model of negotiating deals on single grocery items with manufacturers based on aggregating individual bids from potential customers in a reverse auction (see Priluck, 2001; . The focus of media attention on the startup and subsequent failure of these operations has not been helpful to remaining businesses:
Webvan hurt us in two ways: When they were first on the scene, everybody was sure they were going to win. Then when they shut down, everybody said we couldn't make it either. (Fritz, 2001) In the remainder of this paper I review in detail the logistical issues faced and solutions found by Tesco of the UK, Woolworths of New Zealand, and Quick and Small Potatoes Urban Delivery of Canada. These companies represent quite different scales and strategies, and a brief summary of their "positionality" in the retail scene is first required.
Tesco is a globalising retailer, the largest national food retailer in the United Kingdom.
It has store operations in nine nations (largely central Europe and southeast Asia), more than 200,000 employees and in 2001 made more than UK£1b (US$1.45b) profit, only the second UK retailer in history to reach this mark. The Tesco.com HomeShopping service, begun in earnest in 1999 after CDROM experiments since 1996, is available in more than 300 stores serving more than 90 percent of the country, and has been exported to Ireland and South Korea (Jones, 2001; . It provides almost all its more than 30,000 in-store lines through the online store, plus separate dedicated online stores for a wine club, flowers and baby products. It also claims to stock most electrical goods and appliances, over a million books, and every CD, DVD and game on current release in the UK (Tesco, 2002 (Tesco, 2003 ) (see Table 3 for comparable data for 2000). SKUs, and on-sells specialty items and wine sourced from various other retailers through its "Best of Vancouver" market.
Woolworths Supermarkets
These case study retailers are ranked in terms of spatial scale, from the global Tesco to the national Woolworths (though it is a subsidiary of a international holding company with operations throughout Australasia), to the local SPUD and Quick. Tesco and
Woolworths both have extensive store networks and use stores for fulfilment ("store pick") while SPUD and Quick pick from warehouses, and are thus small-scale (and non-automated) examples of the Webvan model.
Attention now turns to the specific ways in which these retailers attempt to overcome logistical issues in their online operations. I demarcate this analysis into two sections, with the first section emphasising the management of space and time within the store or warehouse, and the second space and time external to the retailer.
Re-solving Internal Space and Time
Grocery stores have a well-marked trajectory of increased customer incorporation within the labour process, in that they were expected to come to the store, pick their goods (including progressing through decision-making steps largely unaided), and take them home. 11 Cope (1996: 68) reports one UK food retail executive as admitting that 'we've got our customers pretty well trained at the moment'. For some retailers this trend was extended to include customer packing and even self-scanning (Nuttall, 1999) , all in the name of "everyday low prices" and store efficiency. Online grocery marks a clear departure from this progression. For customers to trust a "personal shopper" to pick and pack on their behalf, and for retailers to conduct the picking, packing and delivery to unseen customers, requires a reversion in both logistics and psychology.
Customers within the retail store are faced with numerous choices in product selection, and much of the decision making process may go cognitively unnoticed by them. If a desired brand or size is unavailable, the customer is generally able to select an acceptable alternative quite easily, especially as the number of SKUs has ballooned to 30,000 or more in a typical superstore. The walk-in customer may be directed to choose desired alternatives through manipulation of shelf positioning, placing retailer ownlabel products next to (or even in place of) top brands (Corstjens and Corstjens, 1999) .
Online customers face a more daunting task, since scanning a shelf is more problematic in the hierarchical list system (department, aisle, shelf design metaphor - Figure 1 ) that most websites have settled upon, and the result may be less predictable (from the customer's, the retailer's or the manufacturer's perspective), depending on the efficacy of the search system and any deliberate stock placement strategy (Murphy, 2002) .
Virtual retailers have the advantage in the ability to capture the product searches of customers, and in particular the products they are not able to find. 'For the first time we know which items they failed to find and went to look for elsewhere' (Jones, 2001: 42, quoting John Browett, CEO of Tesco.com) . This can include searches for competitors' own-label products, for which the retailer's equivalent own-label can be substituted.
Website design can also enable a customer to escape one of retailing's more manipulative solutions in increasing customer purchases: the spatial disciplining of store layout that forces the typical customer to walk to most areas of the store to complete purchases (for example by placing the meat and produce sections at either side, with dairy at the back and frozen goods in the middle). On the way the customer may be tempted by other goods not on their list, with the final temptation being the impulse bar at the checkout. The online customer can roam the virtual store in any method seen fit, either systematically through the department-aisle-shelf metaphor, 12 randomly by using search functions, or by recalling previous saved lists or orders, and thus is less susceptible to impulse purchases. From the retailer's perspective this is a problem, and requires clever programming to prompt customers for items. Many use internal banner advertising (such as the facial tissues ad in Figure 1 ), similar to in-store radio, television and placard advertisements. Online grocers can also prompt for accompanying goods: select a turkey, and be prompted for cranberry sauce, for example.
Online retailers are also able to more overtly manipulate customer behaviour. E-tailers have the ability to double-guess customers, placing the most frequently purchased brands first in a search or virtual shelf display -determined by that customer's previous purchase history, or of customers of a given demographic in general. This in effect creates a customer-specific retail space "on the fly", in a manner that physical stores cannot replicate. Online retailers can also promote their own-label products, which are typically more profitable, as per the "First Choice" brand in Figure 1 . The problem of product selection in (virtual) space is compounded by inventory procedures in time. While the computer-assisted ordering system that is invoked via the web may eliminate costly human involvement (albeit typically lowly paid part-time checkout operators), these orders are commonly processed through a separate system to that which controls stock reordering, and only reconciled at the end of a cycle, perhaps at the end of each day. This may mean that an item indicated as being in-stock on the internet may in fact have already been sold some time before, and thus require substitution by a picker or being "shorted" (not supplied). Even if inventory systems are instantaneous, on-shelf stock is always subject to unreported "wastage" (theft and damage) and to unpredictable in-store customer demand. This problem is amplified if the retailer does not have a "continuous replenishment" perpetual inventory system such as that used by Tesco, and therefore may not in actual fact know what is on the shelf at any one point in time:
It's pretty traditional in retail not to have perpetual inventory. … It's not just a technology issue, in fact technology is the least of our problems. It's very much a business issue. When you consider how our stores are replenished, some product is easily managed, some product comes through our distribution centres; some of our product walks in the back door in our suppliers' arms and gets planted on shelves by them. … Even with a perpetual inventory system it doesn't necessarily solve all those problems either. While it may be there in stock when it is ordered, it may not necessarily be there when it is picked. However at least you would know you are running out of stock and have got so much on order that is about to be picked [by online customers]. (IT manager, Woolworths, March 2000) While online retailers may have substitution rules (by a different brand at the same size within the same product type; or by same brand, different size, for example) that the customer can specify, it is at the picker's discretion how similar two brands really are (is Pepsi an acceptable substitution for Coke? or the retailer's own brand?). To resolve these issues means making some significant assumptions about the customer's intentions, perhaps based on the retailer's understanding of the customer's reaction to previous substitutions:
The [dog food] she wants is 'Beef and Liver', but we haven't got any. She has also taken some 'Beef', obviously her dog likes beef, so I will substitute two more beef. I wouldn't give her chicken for beef. Minced beef would be another possibility. These are the sorts of things that make our job that much more difficult, because we have to make a decision In order to avoid these substitution issues, in-store fulfilment centres may have to carry extra stock. Woolworths found this problem sufficiently pressing to consider providing a dedicated "emergency" stockpile for high-margin and essential items for the HomeShopping unit, not available to in-store customers. Should this problem be widespread, online retail may result in a significant reversal of the well-established trend of eliminating backroom inventory in favour of "continuous replenishment" (Wrigley, 1998a; Tesco, 2001) . In this case, the desire to mix unpredictable in-store customers (immediate demand) with short lead-times for online customers (two hours in the case of Woolworths - Table 4 ) requires greater use of space in-store for stock. For warehouse-based fulfilment inventory control is less of a problem as it is typically "live" (perpetual) and not subject to "predation" from in-store customer purchases or wastage. The day's orders are therefore significantly more predictable than for the walk-in store, depending on how far in advance orders must be made (Table 4) , and the website inventory should accurately reflect what is actually on the shelf when the order is picked. Retailers may thus control time by requiring customers to order more than a day in advance and by encouraging them to use "standing orders" of regularly purchased items, in return for a discount, as both SPUD and Quick do. This in turn allows the e-tailer to carry reduced inventory, and thus decreased storage space and capital costs for it.
However, having sufficient product inventory can be problematic in fresh food sections also, since product quality is less reliable. While SPUD orders a predictable quantity for its customers since orders are closed one day (for products with known availability) or two days (for special orders from other suppliers such as ready-made soups) in advance, product spoilage or being short-supplied has resulted in a policy of over-ordering, thus requiring greater storage space. SPUD's solution for left-over produce was to open a surplus retail outlet, but if demand builds by walk-in customers it ends up facing the same unpredictable demand as a bricks and mortar grocery store.
HomeShopping units within the store require backroom space for their operations: for the computers that are used to interface between the picking and dispatch operations and the centralised web database system, for the assembly and packing of picked orders awaiting delivery, and for storage of "emergency" stock. While these requirements are not particularly onerous relative to the transhipment space required for pallet-based replenishment, or even the backroom storage of chilled items or fresh produce, these space requirements can eliminate smaller stores from consideration as HomeShopping centres. Space requirements increase if online customers have different tastes to that of the store's catchment area. For example, Woolworths' Auckland fulfilment centre is required to stock specialty cheeses and other haute cuisine items that are not typically demanded in the low to middle class neighbourhood in which the store is situated.
Customer demands can also lead to the impossible or illegal: hot rotisserie chickens cannot be safely transported in a single-cabin refrigerated vehicle, despite being an item very much in demand by corporate customers who prefer deliveries just prior to lunchtime. Likewise supplying live lobster and other shellfish (once promised by
Webvan to showcase their tight delivery times) cannot be easily -or cheaplydelivered.
For a warehouse operation such as Quick space is not a pressing problem if the warehouse is well planned: without customers to accommodate, the layout can be designed for replenishment and picking efficiency rather than eye-catching displays.
Since computers dictate the picking sequence the layout does not need to be "logical" from a customer's perspective. For SPUD the issue of internal space has been resolved in interesting ways. While having a much smaller warehouse (11,000 square feet, compared to Quick's 32,000 and the 300,000 of Webvan), and thus being more prone to out-growing its space, SPUD has entered into cohabitation of new warehouse space (next door to existing operations) with a supplier and a small competitor. This makes imminent sense for a small business, for whom warehouse space is expensive and minimising costs from suppliers can be a big benefit. In this case, replenishing one third of their supply from next door can alleviate the pressure from accidental shorts:
We figure it's just a no-lose deal. They really need the space and it creates a real logistical benefit for us because they are our largest local broker. … all the items that don't require refrigeration can stay in their warehouse space until the last minute, which right now they can't. So we get some benefits there. Of course, if we run out of an item, it's very possible that the additional supply is right next door. Whereas now we have to go through big machinations and phone them and say, "oh, could you please send us three more cases of cherries, we're completely out, we miscounted." And then they have to re-route and come over and drop them off. There's definitely some benefits. (Manager, SPUD, July 2001) and in expanding the area of service to a nearby region:
… we're actually thinking of how we can use them to expand our delivery area. They deliver to all of the home delivery services [in a neighbouring region] … so we could potentially start a service over [there] and they could ship all of the boxes because they typically are half empty by the time they head out … . So they can use the other half of the truck to put our bins in. Since we're right next door, it's just so easy. (Manager, SPUD, July 2001) Sharing space with a supplier and competitor contains significant potential risks should the nature of their relationships or sizes of operation change, but in the short-term it is an intriguing solution, and one that could not be imagined with the large-scale regional distribution centres operated by the superstores.
The final issue of internal space/time management to be covered in this paper is that of store hours. Superstores are increasingly open late, even 24 hours, thus increasing the options for customers while impinging on the lives of workers. The shift to 24 hour opening and decrease in backroom storage space has lead to the death of evening restocking, which used to take place after the closure of the store. Stores are now often restocked around the movements of customers (indeed, this may often be the only time customers can find a staff member to ask questions). Store-based Home Shopping services suffer less from the problem of continuous shelf replenishment than the walk-in customer, since pickers have access to backroom replenishment stock that customers do not, but the pickers' carts are yet another impediment (along with the inventory racks)
to simple aisle navigation. Further, while in theory virtual shopping should be able to operate on a 24-hour basis, in practice many online retailers take down their storefronts at certain periods of the night in order to update the databases that lie behind the system -specials, delivery slots and so on. However, virtual retailers are able to exploit more short-term sales periods that stores cannot: items can be placed on sale -and advertised via email to targeted customers -for as many hours or days as desired, unrestricted by media advertising schedules.
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Thus while it is a cliché that customers may 'shop in their pyjamas' -and in fact many of the customers I interviewed did indeed do that, while young children were sleeping or if breastfeeding late at night -it is not something that can be done at just any time.
The management of virtual space carries with it temporal consequences, and vice versa.
Virtual stores operating "24-hours" also require 24-hour call centres to act as helplines for confused customers, new customer registrations and for order problems. The doomed Webvan set up a very large call centre in Las Vegas, with provision for hundreds of telephone operators. While a large call centre may not be a top of mind image for an online grocer, that is the reality of virtuality.
Re-solving External Space and Time
The "orthodox" retail geography showcased within Jones and Simmons (1990), Wrigley (1988) and Birkin et al (2002) was largely dedicated to understanding and delineating market areas surrounding (potential) superstore sites -calculating the "borders" of a market, its composition and its size-value. This model-based view of (external) economic space was predicated on a spatial-analytical framework and strong assumptions about the rationality of individual consumer behaviour: that movement in space was predictable, and customers would frequent the nearest store in physical distance. It was therefore a simple matter to compute minimum distances from customer locations to a store and delineate distance contours to define market areas. In virtual space this economic world view has a rather different purpose. It is not customers that have to worry about distances to the store, it is retailers that must plot the most costefficient driving route to customer "drops". Efficient routing is a matter of minimising driving time and thus costs, and is highly dependent on the density of drops.
Determining route density is a strategic decision on behalf of the retailer: it is a trade-off between allowing maximum customer flexibility (being able to choose a delivery time, usually in a "slot" of two hours or so) versus distribution efficiency (determining a day and / or time based on geographic area), and retailers have taken various positions on this spectrum (Table 4 above on truck availability, in an effort to increase drop density and reduce costs. It also tried some gentle persuasion in increasing density by indicating when it was already delivering to customers in the neighbourhood -ostensibly as a way of appealing to environmental concern:
'By selecting a delivery window marked with the house icon, you receive the same convenient delivery service while helping us make more efficient use of our delivery vans. By doing so, we can continue to improve our service and contribute to a cleaner environment, too. … At those times when your schedule is less flexible, select a green circle. Whatever you choose, you'll receive the same prompt, courteous service within the convenient delivery window. … Webvan reserves the right to refuse service to any customer.' 14 (Webvan.com website, 26 June 2001) Effectively, this was a way of managing delivery time through encouraging spatial density. Quick of Vancouver has a similar "green consumer" mechanism, again in an attempt to decrease the distance driven on any particular route. Quick has a 90-minute delivery slot every 90 minutes from 7am to 10pm seven days per week, with a blackout period from 1pm to 4pm for truck reloading. Quick purchased GIS-based route planning software to maximise truck efficiency, although in the first year of operation customer volume was insufficient to warrant effective use, and the software was unreliable due to mis-matching of customer data with the GIS road database. Like Woolworths, Quick has a graduated delivery charge, with delivery costs offset by the margin gained on goods sold for larger orders. The minimum order of $60 (US$38) ensures that delivery costs are at least partially met, and encourages bulk orders with a cash-back offer (Table   4 above). Quick also runs temporary promotions of free delivery:
Delivery charges are a very important part of making the [business] model work. Part of the promotions and marketing we run is obviously with this free delivery, on a very short-term basis, to get them to sample the site. It's about breaking them in. I'll do anything I can that will change something that might be a blockade to people trying the service. Once they try it three times I've got them. But I've got to get them to try it three times. (Manager, Quick.com, June 2001) Like Webvan, Tesco also restricts the number of slots available at any particular time, and closes particular areas to orders at particular times if its trucks are wanted elsewhere. Again this is an attempt to increase the number of drops made in a particular area, but the policy can be a barrier to customer acceptance of the service. Tesco used to encourage shoppers to book their delivery slot first before commencing a shop, in order to ensure that a delivery could be made when the customer wanted it. It no longer publicises this, possibly indicating that more slots are available due to increased truck and driver availability, or perhaps that customers never began an order if their desired time wasn't available. Woolworths gets around this difficulty by using a contracted courier company (Murphy 2002; , which can deploy more (unrefrigerated) trucks if necessary. The most stringent delivery policy is that adopted by SPUD in Vancouver. SPUD only delivers four days of the week, Tuesday to Friday, and segments the city into designated "drop day" zones: if it's Wednesday, this must be Kitsilano (Figure 3) . 15 Customers who do not wish to receive a delivery on the chosen day -the time is also specified by the company, and could be anywhere between 9am and 9pm -are welcome to pay C$10 (US$6) for the privilege of arranging a courier delivery, but few do.
SPUD operates on the principle of a four-week rotating system, based around a standard "produce box" and standing orders. The produce box contains a mixture of organic fruit and vegetables, from which customers can add, delete or substitute other available items, including frozen fish and chicken, cleaning products and homeopathic remedies (yes, all in the same box). Customers are encouraged to enter regular purchases on a standing order basis, which enables a modest discount, with customised ordering among the four numbered weeks. This creates a high degree of predictability for orders, given the required one and two-day advance ordering (Table 4) . A standard small box costs C$27 (US$17), with substitutions on produce and grocery item additions altering the actual price; for orders below $30 a $3 delivery fee is charged. Despite this, SPUD gets a number of standard box orders per week:
We have 150 customers a week who are happy to just get a straight produce box and pay the $3 delivery fee even though they could just buy $3 worth more produce and they wouldn't have any fee. It's astounding to us, but to them the $3 is nothing [compared to the minor hassle of changing the contents of The maximum we could do with attended deliveries is 40 a day on a route in an eight-hour shift and we can do 80 [unattended by customers], and so of course that's a huge saving and it's all lost at the door [in attended delivery] -someone looking for their cheque book, writing out the cheque … taking time coming to the door, the kids are screaming … we just don't have any time for that. (Manager, SPUD, July 2001) A combination of causes is responsible for customer acceptance of the regimented delivery day: SPUD's customers appear committed to the concept of organic food and to the organisation's stated goals of environmental and local socio-economic sustainability, including the use of bicycles for delivery in areas surrounding the warehouse (Murphy, 2003) . These benefits do not seem to accrue to the organic offerings of supermarkets, and outweigh any perceived inconvenience of the inflexibility of day and time of delivery.
Curiously, customers and non-customers alike do not seem prepared to take into consideration the costs of picking and delivering the goods, much to the frustration of SPUD's management:
Why is it that people see themselves as shoppers, and have a hard time saying that 'for the same price for the very same items, at no extra cost, I am still unwilling to have someone pack my groceries and ship them to my door, and all I have to do is unpack them. But I'd rather go to the store' … It's very puzzling to me that so few people, just 1%, are willing to take the risk. (Manager, SPUD, June 2001) We can show people very clearly that we bring produce in every day, a grocery store brings it in twice a week. They put it under bright lights in a warm room where the product deteriorates. We keep it in the dark in the cold to the very minute that we bring it out to pack. It is often three to four days fresher than they would get for the very same item in a grocery store. In a grocery store, as long as it looks nice, they will keep it on the shelf, until it sells. And that could be four days later, whereas we don't have anything left on the shelves at the end of the day because we knew exactly what our orders were for the day so we only bought that much. (Manager, SPUD, July 2001) This consumer psychology needs further exploration, as it is doubtful that virtual storefronts can provide sufficient cost efficiencies (despite larger order sizes than is typical in-store) in order to fully subsidise delivery costs. Consumer resistance to paying more for products online -either through cost-plus pricing to recover delivery charges, or through explicit charges -may therefore curtail further expansion of these services. This seems to provide backing for Raijas and Tuunainnen's (2001: 257) claim that grocery shopping is 'habitual, automatic and unthinking'. In their analysis of reasons for choosing or not choosing electronic methods of shopping, Raijas and Tuunainnen contend that 'the time spent in shopping and the money used for transportation are accepted costs that are not taken into account when calculating the total cost for a shopping basket ' (p. 263) .
What results from the unlimited slots delivery policy followed by Woolworths and Quick -apart from possibly more satisfied customers who get a flexible deal -are significant logistical problems for delivery. If the retailer promises to deliver to anywhere in the city in any given time-slot, the result could indeed be driving anywhere in the city during any given 90 or 120 minute period. For Auckland this means a 50 kilometre radius from the fulfilment centre in the very south of the city (Figure 4 ). Source: modified from photo by author, on a modified base map from the Atlas of New Zealand Boundaries (Kelly and Marshall, 1996) careful (but not necessarily computerised) planning of routes, in order to achieve a profitable level of efficiency. Solving customers' problems of time creates problems in space and time for the retailer. In this respect the delivery of groceries to the home suffers like any other domestic-orientated transportation business: it is expensive and expansive.
Vancouver is more densely populated than Auckland, with a significant proportion of residents in downtown highrises and inner-suburban medium density condominiums.
SPUD attracts large numbers of its typically environmentally conscious customers from these dense areas ( Figure 5 ). The extra natural density creates an advantage for route planning, particularly amongst a population accustomed to regimented days of service for rubbish and recycling collections and milk and water delivery, for example. SPUD's drivers can each spend all day delivering to 80 customers and cover only a single suburb ( Figure 3 ).
The spatial distances required for delivery are of importance not only because of their cost implications: there are also food safety guidelines and regulations that must be met.
For chilled foods these include maximum times out of chilled environments -risks which customers take upon themselves when visiting a supermarket, and thus the subject of a "Food Safety First" customer and employee education campaign run by Woolworths New Zealand. Woolworths' contractors use single-partition refrigerated trucks which constrain delivery slots to a few hours, since beyond that ambient goods (potatoes, crusty bread and cereals, for example) will start to deteriorate. Since it uses unattended delivery, SPUD includes polystyrene around chilled items and coolpacks in the bins to extend the time the bins can be left outside, and can thus have its single-partition refrigerated trucks on low refrigeration. 18 Concern over the cold chain is definitely top-of-mind for some of SPUD's customers, since they remain to be convinced that a bin sitting outside all day (since the timing cannot be determined) is safe for these products:
[We shop for some items elsewhere because] we are more comfortable buying refrigerated foods from Capers [an upmarket health-food store] (we can check the date and food is put directly into the fridge). ( Tesco uses multiple partition trucks, but this requires some work by the driver to assemble orders from the three compartments (frozen, chilled and ambient); however it is the kindest on the goods, even if the most expensive and least adaptable solution.
Quick is the only example of the four not to use refrigerated trucks at all, preferring instead to use cheap hard-sided trucks with roll-in chilled and frozen insulated racks, using dry ice. Since it requires attended delivery for payment it does not need to worry about storage of items after the drop, but the in-attendance requirement significantly slows the drop rate to 10-15 minutes per drop, 4-5 per hour, and thus adds to costs (making supply logistics similar to Webvan's in both design and cost).
Quick takes pride in its management of the cold chain, however, claiming that its icecream and other frozen products are delivered to the door in a more reliable state than an in-store customer could achieve. Likewise, SPUD maintains that its produce, despite potentially sitting in a box outside for much of the day, will be fresher than organic produce that can be obtained from a regular (bricks and clicks or bricks and mortar) supermarket where it sits out in the store all day, and having spent longer in the supply chain to get to the store in the first place. Both companies insist that their management of external spaces and product life times can only improve with volume: a virtuous cycle of success breeding improvement.
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Conclusions
It is the contention of this paper that retailing through electronic commerce contains logistical problems that are unique in retailing. In solving these problems, virtual retailers are re-solving problems of space and time, placing in question the trends and solutions found within the increasingly large and well regulated spaces that are the modern superstores. This poses a quandary for retailers that are following a "bricks and clicks" business model -that is, are using an existing physical infrastructure to service online customers (Oinas, 2002; . The design of their selling space is not well suited to picking and packing by store employees on behalf of customers.
Stores are designed to encourage customers to wander throughout store, and thus possibly be tempted by additional items: to them the store is a puzzle, and possibly an obstacle course. Pickers (or (im)"personal shoppers", as they are sometimes labelled) rely instead on information technology to guide them and provide short-cuts to the next item: for them the store is a three-dimensional Cartesian grid, with each aisle, shelf and bay coded and tagged. Pickers compete with customers for store space and products on shelves, and as store representatives may be waylaid (Murphy, 2002) . Backroom space has increasingly been lost as regional distribution centres grew in importance, making the processing of orders (and storage of unusual items for that store's demographic) difficult.
Outside the store logistical problems become more acute: for low densities the delivery run can be very expensive; for high densities a route-planning nightmare -particularly as real space does not conform to the homotropic plane assumed by transportation models and GIS-based route planners. Taking on a dedicated truck system (as per Webvan, Quick, SPUD and Tesco) can be very expensive; contracting it out (a la Woolworths) removes a visible "face" of Home Shopping, since customers see the livery of the courier rather than the retailer. In an interesting twist, however, Tesco was reportedly forced to use more discrete Range Rovers in more upmarket areas due to customer resistance to the Tesco truck trundling up their drives (Gibson, 2001 ).
One of the key tensions within online shopping comes back to the very definition of logistics: that of providing a balance 'between the lowest possible distribution costs and the highest possible customer satisfaction' (Sparks, 1994: 313) . For online food retailers that have allowed maximum flexibility for customers (Webvan, Woolworths, Quick) distribution costs are very high, and without sufficient density, crippling. SPUD has taken the opposite approach, by dictating not only the time but also the day of delivery.
Its customers tolerate this approach for a very simple reason: SPUD offers something no one else can in excellent-quality as-local-as-possible organic produce. Despite store retailer efforts to improve the availability of organic produce and food due to its higher margins, specialist organic suppliers have a much higher turnover (SPUD is the largest organic customer for suppliers in Vancouver) and can shorten the time through the supply chain by several days, thus improving freshness. Customers also seem willing to support SPUD's codified social and environmental objectives much more than is the case for large chain food retailers.
The case of Webvan shows clearly that the supposed efficiencies of picking from a warehouse do not amount to much if customers cannot be found to support the operation: it managed at most to supply 2000 customers per day, compared to a capacity of 8000 per distribution centre (Guglielmo, 2000) . Webvan was not the only warehousebased operation, however: GroceryGateway of Toronto and Quick of Vancouver both claim that their smaller scale (and much less automated -and thus less expensive)20 systems are more likely to generate profitability. SPUD's operation is smaller again, but in the short run at least is the most likely warehouse model to be profitable, given the devotion of its customers and the frequency with which they order (most do so weekly), their density for delivery, and the higher margins on the goods it sells. In the short-term the store-pick method of Tesco and Woolworths carry significant advantages in terms of product freshness and range (due to the turnover driven by in-store sales) and marketing opportunities and investment costs, but carries with it picking inefficiencies due to stores designed for and filled with real customers.
The ability to scale operations as customer numbers grow is a significant issue in electronic commerce. For retailers using the store-pick method, additional fulfilment centres can be relatively easily added by converting backroom space in existing stores (if the trend toward floorspace conversion has not already obviated all available space).
However, running the store-pick method to capacity can lead to conflicts or increased contact between customers and pickers (Murphy, 2002) , thus impeding efficiency. Of course a dedicated distribution centre could always be added to a store-based modelindeed, this is Tesco's key competitor J Sainsbury's strategy, something that Tesco rules out until online customers per store fulfilment centre exceed 10,000 (Jones, 2001 ).
This might, however, require considerable reconfiguration of supply chains:
In terms of our logistics model and our supply chain, the only place that all our product range comes together is in a store. In terms of our warehouses that we have at the moment, we've got dry goods warehouses, we've got separate chilled and frozen warehouses, and separate fresh warehouses, and typically they are physically never in the same location. They might be in the same city, but that is about as close as they get. (Manager, Woolworths, March 2000) Redirecting the disparate supply chains to an existing regional distribution centre (DC) or to a new internet DC may fatally raise costs in the short term without a matching improvement in picking efficiency. This was one of the causes of Webvan's failure, and also lay behind the decision of Wal*Mart's UK food retail subsidiary ASDA in early 2002 to replace its DC-based fulfilment centre in London by store fulfilment.
Scalability is also an issue for the warehouse-based retailers too. Webvan built scale into the business from the beginning, planning for up to 8,000 orders per day per distribution centre, leading to high startup (sunk) costs. Quick and SPUD have some room for expansion, but with their much more limited product ranges do not require anywhere near the scale of operation of Webvan. SPUD's co-lease with an organic wholesaling broker is a short-term solution to managing space (and time), but may not be a good solution in the longer term if the relationship, or growth patterns, change.
It is thus much too early to write off the prospects of online grocery shopping due to the many notable failures within the United States, particularly the Hindenberg-like disaster of Webvan. As Wrigley et al (2002: 188) put it: 'the impacts of fundamental changes brought on by technology are often overestimated in the short-term but underestimated in the long-term' (original emphasis). For now it appears that the advantage may lie with large "bricks and clicks" retail chains, who can build from profitable and scalable store-based fulfilment; and with specialist retailers such as the organic suppliers, who can fill a niche not well suited to the large stores (which are not trusted by organic aficionados, despite the chains' attempts to "go green").
Thus while the failure of some "online grocery upstarts" may 'go down as one of the biggest and most expensive Internet disasters in history' (Ring & Tigert, 2001: 273) , it is by no means certain that this necessarily applies to all online grocers, upstarts or innovative national chains. Indeed, the growth seen in organic home delivery, both as a virtual retail success story and as a notable protest by some customers against the industrialisation and globalisation of food, may yet disprove Wrigley's (2000: 311) claim that 'it seems unlikely that the economic geographies of globalizing retail capital that developed in the late 1990s will be destabilized by the rise of the non-store retailers'. But if these organic home delivery operations are to prosper, their very growth success will mean two things: a requirement for more reliable (and thus possibly more globalised) organic food sources; and a further re-solving in the spaces and timings of online food retail.
